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the long gestation of the book that has become The Mountain and the Valley may explain some of the anomalies in the text that continue to fascinate generations of readers and critics. The facts 
of its composition have been summarized by alan r. young. as young 
relates the chronology, ernest buckler claimed in a letter dated may 15, 
1951, that david’s death was “the very first thing i wrote; the founda-
tion for the whole thesis” (203). however, buckler was contemplating a 
“farm” novel as early as 1939, and knew he had “the foetus of a novel” by 
1946. at that time he had sent out a series of short stories to the publish-
ers harper and brothers, asking if it was “too late for a book which had 
anything to do with the war” (196). The publishers informed him that 
war themes were desperately unpopular and advised him to make the 
war only an incident in the story of a young man forced to watch life 
from the sidelines (198). by 1951, the narrative of the frustrations of this 
young man had developed into the psychological portrait of a “recurrent 
dichotomy in david’s nature” (202). This, presumably, occurred after 
the writing of the opening chapter describing his death was complete, if 
that was indeed the very first thing buckler wrote. The chapter was split 
into two as an effective framing device, and the death reserved for the 
epilogue — by buckler’s own account, “the crowning point of the whole 
dramatic irony” (203). however, the novel as we have it bears the traces 
of its origin, so that it has two conclusions: the false but tragic conclusion 
of the young man left out of the war, and the true but ironic ending of 
his death on the mountain.1
if the narrative is removed from its frame, it culminates in the full, 
tragic close of a complex plot according to aristotle’s Poetics,2 whereas the 
denouement in the epilogue ties together the three different strands of 
david’s journey up the mountain, his discovery of his vocation, and his 
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death. The two structural resolutions are placed at important moments in 
david’s life. They represent his maturity, when the question of what david 
is to be has finally been answered by what he has become, and the close of 
his life, when he completes the long-deferred journey to the mountain-top 
towards which his entire being has been tending. 
The space between them marks a shift in the narrator’s relation to 
his character. even though david is “transparently autobiographical” 
(bissell, Ernest 70), and the reader is brought close to his sensibility, 
buckler remains in control of his portrayal and preserves his objectivity 
and detachment throughout. in the epilogue, however, the distance 
between protagonist and author collapses despite his own ironic inten-
tions. examining the two endings separately may shed new light on the 
present conviction that david’s failure to become an artist is the result 
of a moral flaw or the inevitable outcome of an internal deficiency. This 
view has come to supersede the environmental thesis by which the artist 
is doomed to failure in an uncomprehending and unsympathetic culture. 
The cultural nationalism implicit in the early view, notably developed in 
margaret atwood’s Survival (186-87) and d. G. Jones’s Butterfly on Rock 
(23-25), still haunts the Canadian mantra of the failed artist, although 
recent commentary identifies it more broadly as a problem of modern-
ism. w.b.yeats has stated the modern dilemma succinctly: “The intellect 
of man is forced to choose/ Perfection of the life, or of the work,/ and if 
it take the second must refuse/ a heavenly mansion, raging in the dark” 
(278). david is unable to make this choice and is therefore forced to 
forego both; that he should have a final vision reconciling incompatible 
aims may well be part of the crowning irony of buckler’s plan.
1
The reader’s response to david in The Mountain and the Valley may be 
guided by david’s revised response to herb hennessey, who is the village 
solitary, recluse, and outcast, an uncanny object of wonder to the young 
david, haunting his dreams. as a child, he had felt pity for herb but not 
fear, rather “the sweetest, safest sort of exaltation: that such a thing could 
be, however incredibly, but not ever for him” (59). he would wonder in 
his later years, when he had himself become as solitary as herb, whether 
there wasn’t some justice for the unconscious cruelty in that thought. in 
other words, pity and fear were the correct responses to herb’s situation 
and are by analogy the correct responses to david’s situation. 
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david’s many faults have been identified by his critics as narcissism, 
egotism, immaturity, and vindictiveness, and it may seem contrary to try 
to rehabilitate his reputation in the face of such opposition. yet in his as-
pect as an alienated solitary, buckler does seem to invite both pity for and 
fear at david’s plight. Pity and fear govern the formal literary structures 
of Greek tragedy, the emotions aristotle deemed necessary for its effect. 
reversal in expectation, or peripateia, assists in arousing pity, if we are led 
to expect good things for the hero (or if he has built up his own hopes), 
while recognition, or anagnorisis, shows him the true nature of the causal 
chain that has been unfolding, and our fear arises from our self-regarding, 
albeit sympathetic, identification with him (nussbaum 279). david’s situ-
ation has reversed itself, and he recognizes the part he has played in losing 
the great good fortune that was seemingly the promise of his early years. 
The narrator emphasizes the irreversible, irredeemable nature of this loss, 
as unlimited potential is ultimately curbed by the narrowing of possibili-
ties. here are the peripateia and anagnorisis of the plot:
This was the toppling moment of clarity which comes once to eve-
ryone, when he sees the face of his whole life in every detail. he saw 
then that the unquestioned premise all his calculations had been built 
on was false. he realized for the first time that his feet must go on 
in their present path, because all the crossroad junctions had been 
left irretrievably far behind. anything your own hands had built, he 
had always thought, your own hands could destroy. you could build 
a wall about yourself, for safety’s sake, but whenever you chose you 
could level it. That wasn’t true, he saw now. after a while you could 
beat against the wall all you liked, but it was indestructible. The cast 
of loneliness became pitted in your flesh. it was as plain for others to 
see and shy away from as the slouch of a convict.   (268-69)
Seeing the face of one’s own life is in itself both a recognition and a 
turning point when identity is finally formed, fixed, and known as such; 
the narrator believes that such a moment comes to everyone, without 
exception. david realizes the affective loss he has incurred in growing 
up: “my own life brimmed and emptied so soon, and i could never fill it 
again” (269). he suffers anew from the deprivation of the natural bonds 
of friendship, family, and the male camaraderie of wartime action, but 
he is trapped inescapably within the bright glare of his tragic knowledge, 
“like someone looking for a place to run, the blind way people run out 
of doors when their clothes are on fire” (271). Grotesquely, “with a wild 
comical stagger,” he vents his rage by hacking at the poor parsnips at his 
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feet until, all passion spent, his mind is still, “like the stillness of snow sift-
ing through the spokes of the wagon wheels” (272). Severely chastened, he 
returns to his chores, which are again beyond his strength, but they are now 
dignified by his fortitude and endurance, as the comparison with Joseph, 
his father and the novel’s model of rectitude, makes clear.
So far, david’s predicament has been defined in terms of the tragedy of 
the unlived life, a life whose isolation puts it outside any sphere of purpose-
ful action, thwarting the proper use of its special capacities, although at this 
point he understands no more than his lonely exclusion. his intellectual 
error (the hamartia or fallibility to which human excellence is prone) was 
his belief that he had free will and could exercise it at discretion. The con-
sequences of his solitude have taken him by surprise and he is tragically 
unable to undo its effects. he is responsible for his fate — it lies buried 
like a seed in the soil of his nature — but it cannot be said that he has 
made considered, deliberate choices, knowing them as conscious desires 
and intentions to be acted upon. 
The Nicomachean Ethics distinguishes the passions and faculties, 
which we have by nature, from character. Character alone invites praise 
or blame. it is disposed to virtue or vice, which we call good or bad: these 
are unequivocally modes of choice (aristotle 35). david has merely been 
moved by his feelings at every point in the narrative; he has never acted 
from settled principle or an awareness of issues. once the impetus of his 
temper exhausts itself, he is left either uncertain or vacillating between 
wanting revenge and feeling guilt, regret, remorse, and even an “awful 
penitence” (176). unable to undo his earlier actions, his present inten-
tions fall short of the passing moment. anna is his twin but also his foil 
and, as barbara Pell observes, she acts in opposition to the hereditary 
jealousy and resentments that come naturally to her too, showing an 
emotional maturity in her relation to toby (61). david does not learn to 
exercise a similar moral will, and his character is unformed, the result of 
habitual action but not of willed choice, whether for good or ill. Virtue is 
obtained in its exercise: “it makes no small difference, then, whether we 
form habits of one kind or another from our very youth; it makes a very 
great difference, or rather all the difference” (aristotle, Ethics 29). for all 
his introversion, david unthinkingly allows his temperament to determine 
his conduct at all the “crossroad junctions,” and buckler’s necessitarian 
outlook — or david’s despair — forecloses the future for him. although 
the plot is aristotelian in its construction, david’s motivation does not fall 
within the realm of the ethical. he is impelled instead by drives obscure 
to him, for which he cannot be wholly blamed.
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in its insistence on human agency and intelligibility, aristotle’s 
theory of tragedy is secular, optimistic, and naturalistic, as the practice 
of the tragic Greek poets and dramatists is not. for them, the gods rep-
resent forces beyond human comprehension — whatever in our destiny 
is hopeless, mysterious, and opaque to human reason (halliwell 234). 
buckler’s novel is naturalistic, but it still gestures towards a mysterious 
fatality  —  a determinism beyond that of heredity and circumstance — 
located within the dark tangle of impulses and emotions in the psyche 
that remain forever inaccessible to knowledge. hence david’s mother 
martha’s irrational and irresistible jealous silences, which descend upon 
her from sources over which she has no control. The scenarios of david’s 
more complicated inner life can be explained by the dualistic picture of 
the instinctual life — divided between the sexual instinct and the death 
instinct — in freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle.
here freud famously proposes that the instincts are conservative, 
seeking to revert to an earlier condition of inertia and inorganic existence 
by the circuitous routes peculiar to the development of the organism. as a 
consequence, the aim of every organism is to die in its own fashion. “The 
aim of all life is death,” freud writes, and explains even self-preservation 
as a function that ensures this return by no other way than that which 
is immanent in the organism itself (613). This functioning of the death 
instinct and the sexual instinct is reflected in the polarities of hate and 
love, when they are transferred to an object, as a commingling of aggres-
sion and affection. when the death instinct is forced away from the ego in 
the narcissistic libido, it emerges as sadism in relation to the love object, 
serving a sexual function; but when it turns around on the subject, on his 
own ego, it becomes masochism, there being no difference in principle 
between an instinct turning from the object to the ego, or the ego to the 
object. 
This theory fits david in every respect: an early death holds a special 
attraction for him, and his life derives its momentum from his longing 
to reach the transcendent mountain where Joseph, Spurge Gorman, and 
Pete delahunt go to find their various deaths. on reflecting that david 
alone is left on the farm to pursue a way of life he is eminently unsuited 
for, ellen wonders with her customary prescience whether “he had a love 
of this place as binding as blood, or as it sometimes seemed, a hatred of 
it so dark and stubborn as to fascinate him beyond the fascination of any 
possible kind of love, she didn’t know” (220), and david himself will ac-
knowledge early on the “fascination of hating someone he loved,” until it 
grows to be a bond of fratricidal proportions (81). his sexual encounters 
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with effie are singularly devoid of erotic desire, naturally, as they are too 
young, and marked by self-centred aggression. indeed, they are sadistic, 
as effie’s pathetic attempts at repair afterwards indicate, and arise in each 
instance from a wish to prove his sexual prowess before his male peers, 
although his initial pity for her, especially encouraged by her resemblance 
to his twin, anna, relieves the stark picture of his selfishness. The fine 
stoic endurance he inherits from Joseph degenerates into a masochistic 
enjoyment of pain, the grinding, self-biting satisfactions he derives from 
unpleasure in his work on the farm. buckler may not have been thinking 
of freudian polarities while constructing the   “recurrent dichotomy in 
david’s nature (Country boy or city boy? naive or sophisticated? harsh or 
tender? over-child or over-adult? Serious or comic? homebody or alien?)” 
(young 202), but they help to explain the presence of paralyzing internal 
divisions, conflicts, and perversions of natural instincts gone wrong in the 
psychological portrait of the artist we do have.
Granting the “deep concern” the reader feels for david’s fate as a 
projection of the author, Claude bissell adds the qualification that intel-
lectually he is a “crippled ernest” (Ernest 70). The narrator’s deliberate 
crippling of his character is nowhere as evident as it is in the depiction 
of david’s selection of the themes for the story he begins, to be called 
“Thanks for listening.” had he written of these other things that buzzed 
inside his head, he would have accurately transcribed the novel we are 
reading:
how you could love the land’s face and the day’s face, but how they 
never loved you back; the sun would come out brighter than usual the 
day your father died, and the wind would cut, as blind and relentless as 
ever, the night your brother was lost in the woods …how a man could 
be trapped by his own nature …how, though you cut open his flesh 
you still couldn’t penetrate the skin of separateness each man walked 
around in …how this place had aged, with change …how the knitted 
warmth between its people had ravelled, until each was almost as alone 
in his own distraction now as the city people were … . (255)
instead, he chooses to write overblown pulp fiction, the common material 
of daydreams; he is as usual ashamed of being found out in his creative 
efforts and destroys his writing. in his essay “Creative writers and day-
dreaming,” freud attributes the shame we feel in revealing our daydreams 
to the fact that they are a kind of infantile fantasy that we ought to have 
outgrown, a form of play no longer suitable to the adult mind. at the 
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same time he concedes that the heroic projections of myth and literature 
have their origins here, just as david’s imaginings of his role as “the great-
est” compensate for the drab realities of his life and reassure his wounded 
ego (436-43). in this instance, he writes to get the war over with and to 
show that even though he was not physically fit to take part in the action, 
he had missed nothing essential to the experience of his generation and 
understood it equally well. 
his earlier attempt at writing the story of his relations with his broth-
er, Chris, was a contrary attempt to write from experience, its delivery 
similarly a “cleansing cathartic” (190). his mixed feelings would seem to 
be the reason for his not finishing it. initially, he begins by wanting to 
absolve Chris of blame in his own near-fatal fall during the pig-splitting 
episode. Then his sorrow over the newly emergent fact that rachel has 
trapped Chris into marrying Charlotte swings to jealous envy, as he feels 
himself left out of the drama. The events occurring to his older brother 
appear “newslike” in comparison with which his own lesser ego and his 
existence fade into narrative. Glad that he had not annulled the soreness 
between them or thrown away his “equalizing weapon,” he proceeds to 
blacken the words in his scribbler (193). his creative energies are throt-
tled at their source, not so much by his moral flaws or his conception of 
language as by the prior dynamics of his psychological make-up, for which 
i have proposed a freudian explanation. freud’s biological definition of 
an instinct, in his “instincts and Their Vicissitudes,” is that of a concept 
on the frontier of the somatic and the mental, its working a measure 
of the demand made on the mind by reason of its connection with the 
body. This further exculpates david of willful wrongdoing. his addictive, 
untutored impulses suffice to drag him dangerously down into “The fury 
and the mire of human veins” (yeats 280). how he emancipates himself 
from these guilty, shameful, secretive depths and regains the good of the 
intellect is the burden of the epilogue.
2
toby’s departure for the war is the occasion for david’s reflection that “the 
train of your own life went by and left you standing there in the field” 
(271), but until then his solitary existence has not been unpleasant and is 
even sustaining. it is only when his subjectivity collides with that of others 
that he feels his bareness exposed, and his self-consciousness surfaces as an 
image of his own face and body intervening between him and the world. 
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we might expect that it is buckler’s intention to develop his characteriza-
tion as a hero of existentialist angst, and indeed the Prologue describes 
david’s ennui as he listens to the empty silence, his own “disappearance of 
voice” indicating  his hollow, estranged, disaffected existence (Van rys 67). 
however, a shift of register occurs in the epilogue and, although the two 
categories are not mutually exclusive, the david who climbs the log road 
conforms to the portrait of emerson’s idealist, or the transcendentalist as 
he appeared in 1842 in emerson’s essay of the same name. 
emerson divides the world into two sects, the materialists and the 
idealists. The former base their thinking on experience and the data gath-
ered by the senses, while the latter found it on consciousness, believing 
that the senses are not final and give us only representations of things — 
representations which are of the same nature as the faculty that reports 
them, so that it is always our own thought that we perceive — and what 
things are in themselves they cannot tell. ellen’s skill as an artisan and 
her success at storytelling would classify her as the former, while david’s 
inability to represent reality with exactness in words, his “simultaneous 
facility and difficulty with language” recently examined by Stephen ross, 
could be ascribed to the impassable distance between thought and thing 
— or event — in subjective idealism (67).
while the materialist insists on facts, history, circumstance, and the 
animal wants of man, the idealist, which according to emerson is the more 
highly evolved type, insists on the power of thought, will, inspiration, 
miracle, and individual culture. mind is the only reality, according to the 
idealist hypothesis of the phenomenal nature of the world: it acquaints us 
with the total disparity between the evidence of our own being and the 
evidence of the world’s being. yet, concludes emerson in a caveat on the 
idealist position in his essay “Spirit,”
if it only deny the existence of matter, it does not satisfy the demands 
of the spirit. it leaves God out of me. it leaves me in the splendid 
labyrinth of my perceptions, to wander without end. Then the heart 
resists it, because it balks the affections in denying substantive being 
to men and women.  (30)
buckler explores a comparable hypothetical condition in david that de-
nies the existence of matter (and the substantive being of another in the 
planning and plotting by which he shapes reality to his imagination), but 
without reference either to a first cause or to meaning, which is emerson’s 
final cause. Janice kulyk keefer has described david’s setting out on the 
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road to the top of the mountain as an intricate narrative of perception, 
and i agree that it is with this “narrative of perception” (like emerson’s 
“splendid labyrinth of my perceptions”) that buckler himself is most 
insistently engaged (225). 
The glass of the window pane where david stands doubles as the 
idealist’s glass of the mind, making touch between any two things impos-
sible. The log road he walks on during moments of emotional disturbance 
to experience shafts of clarity — his flesh levitating as it seems — appar-
ently leads to the transcendent truth built into the top of the symbolic 
mountain. he becomes both seer, “one great white naked eye of self-
consciousness, with only its own looking to look at,” and what he sees, 
“it was as if the outline of the frozen landscape became his consciousness” 
(275). his meeting with the materialist Steve, and his indulgence of Steve’s 
fondness for body jokes, marks david’s passage past them. 
emerson’s definition of good writing as “perpetual allegories” in his 
essay “nature” is exemplified by buckler’s prose. of the speaker’s mental 
process emerson says, “a material image, more or less luminous, arises 
in his mind, contemporaneous with every thought, which furnishes the 
vestment of the thought” (15). more usually, thought follows perception 
of the visible world in buckler’s writing: “the day is the determinant,” but 
david’s subjectivity shapes nature in his own image (47). The bareness of 
the landscape gradually acquires face and flesh as his numbing alienation 
yields to guilt and his climb up the purgatorial mountain becomes an al-
legory of penitence and reconciliation. 
Coexistence with toby and delight in his strong young flesh had 
enabled anna to exclaim “it’s perfect here” as they walked up the moun-
tain (260). The self-dependent, self-sustaining solitude of the emerson-
ian idealist enables david to make the same remark at the same place as 
soon as he finds himself “absolutely alone” (280). he discerns a thread 
of similarity fusing his sensory impressions and memories by a kind of 
apperception, and lays time out flat for, like space, it is an intuition of 
the mind. his Proustian “translation” returns him for an instant to the 
pure potentiality of his childhood, but the illusion passes and emerson’s 
“eternal distinction between the soul and the world” asserts itself in all 
the accusing voices of the world that hunger to be seen and heard (30). 
he thinks he must be each one in turn, annihilating his own identity in 
the process, to silence their accusations. but the impossibility of attending 
not only to the multiplicity of things and thoughts around him but also 
to those that had existed which he had never seen and known, and those 
that might have been, overwhelms him. reflecting on the causal chain that 
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led to his father’s death leads to a similar impasse of thought, as the hand 
that held the axe that felled the tree loses both agency and significance 
to become a meaningless word: “and ‘n’ is a letter in the word, shaped 
exactly that way, and sounded by exactly that movement of the tongue, 
and in exactly how many other words?” (290). The thought of rendering 
the nature of thinking itself traps him in an infinite regress, hysterically 
screaming “stop” until the blockage is released at the peak and he sees the 
valley lying below. 
he resolves to write of the lives he has known: “i know how it is 
with everything. i will put it down and they will see that i know” (292). 
The summit yields the emersonian knowledge that unity or a “single 
core of meaning,” like a beam of light or a law in physics, might illumi-
nate the inexhaustible variety of human experience (292). The narrator’s 
comment that david does not consider how he would find this unifying 
principle, as if it could be stated as a proposition, is a reflection on the 
futility of this philosophical endeavour. The self, too, proves incapable of 
being transcended; neither does all “mean egotism” vanish, for david still 
wishes to impress the people of entremont, nor is the soul caught up by 
the over-soul (emerson 6). instead, he comforts himself modestly with 
the notion that penitence might yet be greater than the offence among the 
good people of entremont. he hopes that his writing will not only give 
an absolving voice to the dear departed but also acquit him of denials or 
failures of love, while showing them that these were never intended. his 
imagination leaps to his own becoming the greatest writer in the whole 
world and relaying the news of his prize-winning book to anna in “one 
final transport of self-deception” (young 203). at this point his heart 
stops. whether he dies a sorry victim of vanity or finds the will to affirm, 
as robert Gibbs suggests in his afterword to the novel, is the question that 
divides most interpretations of the book (302). but the point is that david 
desires a yeatsian “perfection” of both the life and the work, not one at 
the expense of the other, and has no wish to transcend human happiness 
for any greater good. had it been retained intact, had his nature not been 
hobbled at the start, had innocence not been corroded by experience, he 
might have been the writer buckler became by eliminating david — the 
author principally of Ox-Bells and Fireflies. 
The idealist (and Theosophist) closer in time to buckler than emer-
son was Lawren harris, the premier painter of mountain scenery in 
Canada. dennis reid reports that by 1950, when harris was sixty-five, 
a subtle shift had taken place in the way harris’s mystical painting was 
perceived across the country. he quotes one contemporary critic’s descrip-
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tion of harris’s abstractions as “The art of a Puritan who, by the rigorous 
imposition of theory, strives to create some kind of metaphysical ecstasy 
in paint” (52). both buckler’s mountain and his skepticism about — or 
disillusionment with — the metaphysical ecstasy it affords are therefore 
grounded in the period during which the novel was written. 
The Mountain and the Valley traverses the history of nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century painting. The book makes an allusion to the idealized 
realism of millet’s rural scenes, for which there is a maritime precedent 
in roberts’s sonnet “The Sower,” its rhyming soil and toil enclosing the 
informing myth of the land. it is represented in the novel by martha and 
Joseph; picking up potatoes on their knees in the acre field, “they looked 
as if they were praying” (119). Then there is the impressionism of “the day 
of evocative light” passage (112-13). The Cubism of marcel duchamp’s 
Nude Descending a Staircase, mentioned in its context as an analogue for 
the pattern and design found in the structural regularities of the smallest 
particles of nature, has been interestingly discussed by Laurence ricou as 
an analogue for the excessive superimpositions of slightly differentiated 
images (61). he suggests that these convey the multiplicity of impressions 
and associations and contribute to the “high metaphysical style” of buck-
ler’s prose, originally identified by bissell in his introduction to the 1961 
edition of the novel (x). buckler himself has described it as his “pointil-
liste” method, arising from his mathematical turn of mind as “the ‘equals’ 
obsession” (bissell, Ernest 120-21). i am inclined to find a precedent for it 
in emerson’s correspondences, and buckler will rely on this term for those 
“tangents of import behind the simplest fact” in Nova Scotia: Window on 
the Sea (110). to these historical allusions we must add the riddling ab-
stractions of the symbolic art of the epilogue — the triangular mountain 
and the concentric circles of ellen’s rug (drawn, incidentally, by david, 
and unlike the rich landscape designs of her previous rugs). These forms 
were considered essential by kandinsky, another Theosophist, in concep-
tualizing space and constituting the “primary pair of contrasting planes,” 
the circle representing the horizon (davis 126). ann davis explains the 
meaning of these forms within the theosophical scheme: “theosophists 
believed that aspiration, both devotional and intellectual, was depicted as 
a pointed form, while thought on the Logos took a circular form” (127). 
There is a curious passage in Nova Scotia: Window on the Sea in which 
buckler writes of nova Scotia, “it forms an isosceles triangle with the 
man who loves it; welding him, where their equal sides converge, to the 
universals” (112). The geometrical precision of this difficult-to-visualize 
image can leave no doubt that buckler was aware of the symbolic content 
118   Scl/Élc   
of abstract art, whatever his source — whether he had read kandinsky’s 
Concerning the Spiritual in Art, was acquainted with the Canadian paint-
ers, or knew the theosophical writings of madame blavatsky herself. 
in reacting against the materialism of darwinist thought, Theosophy 
tried to parallel darwin’s account of history and physical evolution with an 
equivalent evolution on a spiritual plane, advocating “the Path” of intro-
spection as the means by which humankind could ascend the evolutionary 
neoplatonic ladder from self to community to godhead. in Canada, its 
hope of universal brotherhood assisted in promoting a socialist future, this 
vision of community interrupting the unmediated leap to godhead in the 
american transcendentalist tradition of the emersonian variety (Lacombe 
113). The toronto Theosophical Society was active in the 1930s, when 
buckler was in toronto. Comparing The Mountain and the Valley with 
Look Homeward, Angel, david williams decides that the proud isolation 
and exalted individualism of the american artist give way to a sense of 
community in the Canadian work (158), but Pell is suspicious of the 
sentimental “shine” that david’s euphoria sheds over the valley (69), and 
keefer finds the idea of david’s tormented sensibility giving voice to the 
robust natural life of the villagers so incongruous that she thinks he must 
be killed off (228). The novel points to the economic reasons for the slow 
dissolution of community and shows the social results of the passing of a 
rural way of life; david’s wish to celebrate his valley glosses over the reali-
ties of his discontent. buckler’s parody of ascent up the neoplatonic ladder 
does seem to extend to the theosophical notion of community.
Since Theosophy was a syncretic philosophy derived from many 
religious traditions, its tenets overlap with transcendentalist beliefs. reid 
summarizes its teachings as follows:
Theosophy teaches that everything that exists is inextricably intercon-
nected in a great cosmic movement of becoming. Thus, every action, 
good or bad, carries infinite repercussions, or ‘karma.’ Theosophists 
also believe that everything is governed by one immutable law, which 
is truth, and that man once had direct knowledge of this essential 
unity, but lost it through divisive sectarianism and an intemperate 
pursuit of materialism. only by turning every effort to understanding 
the unity of all things, to knowing the essential motivating spirit of all 
being, can one aspire again to the perfect condition of pure spiritual-
ity, entirely free of gross matter. Since karma is cumulative, spiritual 
progress can be achieved through reincarnation.  (10)
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Theosophical ideas, like american transcendentalism, encourage an aes-
thetics of the infinite, an art of the epiphany, by which the veil is parted 
and “the truth” or this essential unity shines through. buckler’s text will 
play with the paradox that a.S. byatt has observed in another context, 
that “Linear stories of death carry inside themselves images of infinity, 
as topologies of infinity carry inside themselves images of death” (140). 
as a linear story of death, david walks up the log road on his path to 
enlightenment, but his quest is baffled by the limitations of the human 
mind to understand the infinity of becoming, or to trace causality to its 
origins, or to discover madame blavatsky’s one truth in this life. her image 
of a ray of pure white light does, however, appear at david’s death: “and 
then the blackness turned to grey and then to white: an absolute white, 
made of all the other colours but of no colour itself at all” (294). but the 
attainment of the “perfect condition of pure spirituality, entirely free of 
gross matter” casts doubt on the theosophical project and the concluding 
pages refute this specific idealist claim (reid 10).   
Simultaneously with david’s death, the snow begins to fall and 
ellen inserts the white centre that completes her rug, calling for dav-
id, “‘where is that child?’ she said. ‘you never know where that child 
is’”(295). The design of the rug, a series of concentric circles, resembles 
the traditional aristotelian world-picture, an ordered cosmos or a Closed 
world, best articulated in dante’s Paradiso. it is conspicuously a human 
artefact — we witness its making — while the snowscape providing 
david’s life with its closure resembles the infinite universe of the Greek 
atomists. These two views of space belong to contradictory schools of 
thought in the history of Greek philosophy, as david furley demon-
strates in The Greek Cosmologists (1-8). madame blavatsky’s synthesis has 
the merit of reconciling them, by faith rather than reason, as two sides 
of the same coin. She explains the paradoxical nature of space, both a 
“limitless void” and a “conditional fullness,” as being “on the plane of ab-
solute abstraction, the ever-incognisable deity, … and on that of mayavic 
perception, … the absolute Container of all that is, whether manifested 
or unmanifested: it is, therefore, that abSoLute aLL” (qtd. in davis 
122). it is no accident that the symbols prominent in Theosophy — the 
triangular mountain or pyramid, the concentric circles, and the universal 
void — cluster together at the end of the epilogue. The paradox of space 
is invoked only to be separated into its antithetical elements, the Closed 
world and the infinite universe, and the final emphasis of the novel is 
uncompromisingly material.  
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when david examines his thought process, he finds his stream of 
consciousness breaking down or “forking” endlessly like a “chicken-wire 
pattern of atoms” (290). The universe is made of the same irreducible 
stuff as his brain, and the first fall of snow mimics the cosmology of the 
atomists, whose point of view was remarkably like that of modern science 
(russell 85). Snow falls, initially flying in all directions like the original 
motion of atoms in a void, until it descends to the valley through the ac-
tion of a vortex: the mountain slopes, which shut the valley in completely. 
flakes collide and cling together to form matter. david’s life slowly departs 
with the vital heat, vital heat constituting soul in the speculations of the 
atomists, who do not admit the possibility of either a transcendent or an 
immaterial soul. The partridge that rises from the ground — no soaring 
skylark — is not “free of gross matter” (reid 10). it is of the earth, earthy: 
the emphasis  falls on its heavy body, the weight of its flight straight 
downwards, and the intense, swooping exactness with which it descends, 
enacting the laws of physics or mechanical necessity that lie at the heart 
of the tree that kills Joseph.
The novel’s closing scene, with its chaotic rain (or snow) of falling 
atoms, “like tiny white feathers from a broken wing” (295), reiterates the 
epistemological problem of the knowing subject that has undercut both 
the transcendental and theosophical renditions of david’s experience. 
david’s other premise that reality is mental and depends on the relation 
of knower and known, while accounting for his “perceptual hysteria” 
(keefer 226), also proves to be false: the world continues to exist without 
david’s being there to perceive it, the snow covering him and the log on 
the ground alike. Soon the ground is all white and “on the trackless road 
there were no tracks but now a white track could be made” (295). another 
david will tread the same ground, the possibilities of his mind under 
erasure in a reality defined by density and weight. whether this mind can 
affirm subjective validity against material inimical to lasting impression is 
left in doubt. in effect, the closing scene inverts idealist assumptions by 
evoking a universe of matter to which the mind is a stranger — extrane-
ous, superfluous, dispensable.
what then are we to make of david’s whiteout, an absolute white 
made of all the colours but of no colour in itself? ellen stands in a similar 
focus of light at her husband’s grave, “the one sure spot” (84), an achieved 
perfection where all is unchangeably ended and nothing can be added 
or taken away. its neoplatonic imagelessness has overlaid and enamelled 
the phenomenal world as seen under the fleeting, ephemeral aspect of 
the changing light of the year, but in its dramatic context the moment is 
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ambiguous. Should we think that david has once more been deluded by 
his nostalgia for the absolute or should we say that, like Virginia woolf ’s 
Lily briscoe, he has had his vision? This question arises because the colour 
symbolism is elaborated alternately as a “conditional fullness” in the rug, 
and as a “limitless void” in the snowbound landscape (davis 122). 
buckler admired dante and Shakespeare, for having done it consum-
mately before him (Cameron 10). The Divine Comedy may be the narrative 
subtext that joins the symbolism of david’s South mountain vision of an 
earthly Paradise (from Purgatory), to ellen’s rug, a diagram of the heav-
ens. anna might be considered the equivalent of the beloved beatrice, the 
twin with whom david unites his soul in an image of completion. The 
novel exploits the interval between the last two canticles of The Divine 
Comedy to present an unbridgeable chasm. its narrative progression sug-
gests that david loses faith, hope, and charity — the theological virtues of 
the Christmas pageant — as he grows older. he regains hope and charity 
at the end (in an unironic reading) which are insufficient without faith. 
faith is precluded from a post-theological world; it is given to ellen who, 
as ross argues, bears the ideological burden of the pre-modern (59). The 
insertion of the white centre of ellen’s rug is peculiarly her own personal 
act, the lace coming from a dress she had worn.
dorothy Sayers makes a distinction between the literal meaning of 
dante’s story, a journey through the three realms of the afterlife, and its 
allegorical significance, and more specifically its moral sense, as it speaks 
of the condition of the soul in this life (Hell 67-69, 15). This moral sense 
predominates in buckler’s handling of his characters, who are known not 
so much by their punishment or penance in the afterlife as by the qual-
ity of their suffering in this life. all the characters finally find themselves 
“limited and alone in the inner worlds their perceptions have created,” 
particularly at the moment of death (macdonald 199). effie, as Love, dies 
peacefully in her soft clean bed; Joseph, martha, bess, Spurge Gor-man, 
Pete delahunt, david, and toby variously exemplify dantean ascent and 
descent themes. Chris, too, circles round and round in his frustration 
in the cellar of rachel Gorman’s house. in fact, rachel causes much of 
the marital discord in the edenic valley-world, but to pursue her faintly 
melodramatic role to its archetypal conclusion goes against the novel’s 
naturalism. 
in his small but richly suggestive book on dante, erich auerbach 
develops the view that the pilgrim-poet of The Divine Comedy encoun-
ters the fulfilled destinies of historical and mythic characters (his own 
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as yet unfulfilled), as they stand in the eye of Providence, gathered up 
in an eternal order (132-33). The eschatological certainties of the poem 
derive from a vast medieval Thomist-aristotelian framework. The modern 
novelist can draw on neither the framework nor its certainties; as a conse-
quence he is driven once more to demonstrating the problematic nature of 
human judgement by confounding the infernal and purgatorial inflections 
of dante’s universe in entremont. david is mistaken in believing that he 
has caused effie’s death and he is unable to maintain the intensity of his 
purgatorial remorse over time however hard he might try.
Similarly, the deaths by drowning of Spurge Gorman and Pete dela-
hunt are surrounded by innuendo; heroic sacrifice is implicated in motives 
of despair or revenge, although the mountain setting is perhaps intended 
to ennoble their end, as in Joseph’s case (and toby’s, since anna has her 
premonition at its peak). martha and Joseph, cripplingly close and strain-
ingly far, are like the couples helplessly conjoined in dante’s nether realms 
who are one another’s doom. yet the theological implications of bess’s 
suicide are challenged by the pathos of her newfound fidelity to fred and 
his defiant love for her. invoking the god of small things, buckler has said 
that the novel celebrates love (Cameron 11); the consolations and perils of 
the love stories he tells, however, suggest an ambivalent good, imbued with 
human frailty. Sacrificial effie, forgiving everything and understanding 
nothing, is a far cry from beatrice, conduit of Light and Love in dante’s 
poem (brandeis 122). 
nevertheless, the strict justice of dante’s theological template based 
on acts of moral choice is never questioned and it retains its validity, even 
as speculation on the afterlife is cut short. within dante’s scheme, david’s 
sins would have been pride, wrath, and envy, the lower sins of egotism in 
Purgatory (Sayers, Purgatory 62): these are the givens of his nature, the 
predispositions he is born with. memory defines him as he climbs — he 
is trapped by time, reliving his past (kertzer 85) — but the contrition 
and new resolve that come to him in his dying moments bespeak change 
and the decisive emergence of the moral will, at last capable of choosing 
rightly although as yet untried in action and unpracticed in virtue . The 
admixture of self-deception, however, is characteristically Shakespearean, 
and a.t. Seaman has proposed Lear’s wheel of fire as the 
paradigm for david’s purgatory (171). as Lear dies believing Cordelia 
lives, david dies imagining telling anna that his book won a prize, but 
on the whole the Lear mould sits uneasily on david. tragic suffering of 
the dark, Shakespearean kind is missing from his end, the aristotelian 
pity and fear necessary for the tragic effect having been used up immedi-
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ately before the epilogue, which is then concerned with the attempt to 
transcend tragic experience by escaping from selfhood. it is at this that 
buckler directs his irony. 
The two endings of the novel contain parallel moments of retrospect: 
in his tragic recognition, david sees the face of his own life as that of one 
who would always be a stranger, but in his ascent up the mountain, the 
valley itself seems a stranger who reveals the face of a friend. if he was 
wrapped in purgatorial flame before, now firelight and sun-shadow add 
a forgiving softness and warmth to the view. when david invests the 
mountain with extraordinary significance, reading the signs of guilt and 
reconciliation into his ascent, is he again mistaken? The emersonian ide-
alist can know nothing definitively about a reality other than that of his 
own mind. The idea has altered but the facts have not — david’s imagina-
tion may almost light up the valley with a paradisal glow, but just as his 
book does not get written, the reunion with anna does not happen, not 
on this side of paradise. The mountaintop is less a place of release than a 
“Purgatory blind” — without exit, where the ascent must be continually 
remade (keats 383). david’s death merely unmasks a dualism of mind 
and matter, of the Closed world and the infinite universe, which his life 
had barely disguised.  
The double ending of the novel thus signifies a change in the con-
cepts governing buckler’s characterization of david; he shifts his ground, 
testing one assumption, that the will is free, in the tragic structure of the 
story of his life, and another, that reality is mental, in his portrait of the 
defeated idealist of the epilogue. The mode of representation alters as 
well, the mimetic mode of the main narrative giving way to the expres-
sive method of the epilogue. but we cannot summarily describe The 
Mountain and the Valley as a transition from a classical theory of art to 
romantic expressiveness by which the mirror becomes a lamp, as in m.h. 
abrams’s well-known formulation: “the mirror held up to nature becomes 
transparent and yields the reader insights into the mind and heart of 
the poet himself ” (23). The themes and images developing the story of 
david’s early years are romantic by definition, and state a wordsworthian 
belief in both the imaginative and affective stores of happy childhood and 
the reciprocity of man and nature, iconically represented by the living, 
breathing Christmas tree of hope as an aesthetic of organic unity. The 
adult david’s experience in the epilogue, like that of a second generation 
british romantic poet, deconstructs this earlier ideology of teleological 
purpose. The brook where he stoops to drink, for example, reflects his face 
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but he does not remark his reflection: this variant of a Shelleyan motif 
implies that the self might still find itself in nature in the wordsworthian 
way, were it to look beyond its self-absorption, yet this reflection is at the 
same time both unstable and illusory — it wobbles and disintegrates. The 
log road, while it leads to the promised (freudian) end, also disappoints 
in the various ways i have discussed, so that these negative suspensions 
become the signs of buckler’s modernism. 
The novel represents buckler’s cathartic attempt to recuperate his 
losses, overcoming guilt and alienation and regaining access to springs 
of feeling that might have grown dry with the passage of time. unlike 
wordsworth in his “immortality ode,” buckler finds little consolation 
in the “years that bring the philosophic mind” or at least none in the 
philosophies available to him (wordsworth 460).
notes
1 i have borrowed the concept of the double ending and the method of arguing from 
the end from david Gallop’s “Can fiction be Stranger Than truth? an aristotelian answer,” 
Philosophy and Literature 15 (1991): 1-18. until recently, most studies of The Mountain and the 
Valley have depended for their interpretation on the one ending of the epilogue.
2 buckler had an ma in Philosophy and had written on either aristotle’s psychology of 
character (bissell, Ernest 37) or his theory of conduct (orange 2), so it is not unreasonable to 
suppose that he would have been familiar with aristotle’s literary criticism. i have not been 
able to consult the manuscript collection in the buckler archives at the university of toronto 
to verify the scope of his philosophical work on aristotle.
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